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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Max Ritchie Cooke is presently serving sentences for second degree kidnapping, 
aggravated battery, and assault. In 2004, Mr. Cooke initiated a post-conviction case 
through which he has raised collateral challenges to the convictions and sentences in 
his underlying criminal case. 
Ultimately, Mr. Cooke's amended petition for post-conviction relief was summarily 
dismissed by the district court. Mr. Cooke now appeals the district court's order of 
summary dismissal, contending that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on each of 
the four claims for relief asserted in his amended petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2003, Max Ritchie Cooke was convicted of one count of second degree 
kidnapping, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of assault, and received 
three concurrent prison sentences. (R., pp.11-12; 48.) He remains in the custody of the 
Idaho Department of Correction. (R., pp. I I ;48.) 
On October 5, 2004, Mr. Cooke filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief 
and an attached affidavit of supporting facts. (R., pp.11-20.) The State filed two 
responsive memoranda, one on November 12, 2004, and one on January 28, 2005. 
(R., pp.34-38; 39-42.) 
On April 6, 2005, the district court issued an order purporting to dismiss 
Mr. Cooke's petition, but at the same time allowing Mr. Cooke approximately 60 days to 
file an amended petition.' (R., pp.45-46.) 
On June 6, 2005, Mr. Cooke, this time through counsel, filed a verified Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.47-52.) In his amended petition, Mr. Cooke 
asserted four claims for relief: 
1) There is new evidence, not previously presented, which requires vacation 
of Mr. Cooke's conviction. Specifically, there is previously-unpresented 
evidence indicating that one of the State's key witnesses, the victim of 
Mr. Cooke's alleged crimes, Alison Cooke, was not competent to have 
testified at Mr. Cooke's trial due to memory losses suffered as a result of 
head injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. 
2) Mr. Cooke's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) procure the 
services of a medical expert who could have testified as to Ms. Cooke's 
incompetence or, at least, impeached her testimony with evidence that 
she was at substantial risk for having false memories; and (b) adequately 
cross-examining Ms. Cooke regarding her memory loss. 
3) Mr. Cooke's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of 
appeal as requested by Mr. Cooke. 
4) Mr. Cooke was prevented from timely filing a pro se notice of appeal when 
the prison paralegal misadvised Mr. Cooke as to his filing deadline and 
refused to notarize or mail Mr. Cooke's notice of appeal? 
-- 
' It is Mr. Cooke's position that the district court's order, because it specifically contemplated the 
continuation of the same case, was more akin to a notice of intent to dismiss than an actual order of 
dismissal. (See R., p.45.) 
* Mr. Cooke apparently abandoned a number of claims, originally made in his initial petition and affidavit, 
regarding his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. (Compare R., pp. 16-1 9 (original affidavit 
alleging ineffectiveness for failing to: (a) hire an investigator andlor accident reconstructionist; (b) call 
certain witnesses; (c) communicate with Mr. Cooke or provide Mr. Cooke with discovery materials; and (d) 
correct certain errors in the presentence investigation report) with 47-52 (amended petition asserting only 
the above-identified claims).) Nevertheless, the claim regarding trial counsel's alleged failure to hire an 
investigator was argued by the parties and ruled upon by the district court. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.2, Ls.13-15 
(Mr. Bourne's assertion that "I think there is a claim that he failed to hire an accident reconstructionist"), 
p.10, L.9 - p.11, L.19 (colloquy between district court and Mr. Cooke's counsel regarding the accident 
reconstruction report that was actually used at Mr. Cooke's trial), p.12, L.8 - p.14, L.10 (identifying district 
court's concern that it could not know if the reconstruction report used at trial was inaccurate since 
Mr. Cooke had failed to obtain a second report in conjunction with his post-conviction case); p.16, L.22 - 
p.17, L.6 (apparently ruling on claim relating to accident reconstructionist); R., p.86 (denying claim 
relating to accident reconstructionist because "[tlhe Court finds that the petitioner has failed to carry his 
(See R., pp.47-52.) Mr. Cooke attached to his amended petition four affidavits. (See 
generally R., pp.54-61 (affidavit of Allison Cooke, attaching documents, including a 
medical report detailing her head injuries and the impact those injuries had on her 
memory and mental functioning generallyI3 as well as a letter describing the motor 
vehicle accident which caused those injuries, asserting that, because of her memory 
problems, she was not competent when she testified at Mr. Cooke's trial), 62-63 
(affidavit of Mr. Cooke detailing his conversations with the prison paralegal, and 
asserting that she refused to notarize his notice of appeal), 64-65 (affidavit of Mr. Cooke 
detailing his conversations with his trial counsel, and asserting that immediately after 
being sentenced he specifically requested that a notice of appeal be filed), 66-69 
(affidavit of Timothy D. McMillin).) 
On July 1, 2005, the State filed a joint response/motion for summary dismissal. 
(R., pp.71-74.) With regard to Mr. Cooke's two claims relating to Ms. Cook's memory 
loss, the State asserted that: (a) Ms. Cooke was, in fact, competent and reliable to 
testify at Mr. Cooke's trial;4 (b) because they were not contemporaneous with 
Ms. Cooke's trial testimony, the medical report attached to her affidavit, the letter 
burden to prove that trial counsel was ineffective" for failing to hire an independent accident 
reconstructionist).) 
Notwithstanding the fact that this particular claim was apparently tried by consent of the parties, see 
I.R.C.P. 15(b), Mr. Cooke does not now appeal the summary dismissal of that claim. He concedes that 
because he only alleged that, "[tlo the best of [his] knowledge" his trial counsel failed to hire an accident 
reconstructionst (as opposed to a more affirmative statement of fact) (R., p.16), he has failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. However, this allegation is interesting since it makes it clear that 
Mr. Cooke was not kept abreast of the status of his case. 
That medical report states that Ms. Cooke had received "a severe traumatic brain injury," that she was 
"disoriented and easily confused," that, "[slhe was not oriented to city, month, day of the month, or year," 
that she could not perform simple multiplication, that, "[slhe still appears to be in posttraumatic amnesia 
and has severe deficits with memory," that her "[rleasoning is ... still in the severe range of impairment," 
that she "is still demonstrating very severe problems with confusion, disorientation and severe memory 
impairment," that she is not "competent or even appropriate for a police or forensic evaluation or interview 
at this time," and that "her information will likely be misleading, unreliable, and she is at risk for developing 
new memories or false memories rather than accurately recalling what happened ..." (R., pp.59-60.) 
attached to her affidavit, and the affidavit itself, are not relevant to Ms. Cooke's ability to 
accurately remember anything at the time she testified; and (c) as far as counsel for the 
State can personally recall, Ms. Cooke's letter and affidavit are consistent with her trial 
testimony and Ms. Cooke testified that she could remember some facts, but could not 
remember  other^.^ (R., pp.72-73.) With regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for his attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal, the State, 
relying on an affidavit from Mr. Cooke's trial attorney, refuted Mr. Cook's 
characterization of the facts and claimed that Mr. Cooke's request for an appeal was 
made after the 42-day time limit for filing an appeal. (R., pp.73-74; 77-78.) Finally, with 
regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of denial of access to the courts, the State, relying on an 
affidavit from Janel Gardner, the prison paralegal, again refuted Mr. Cook's 
characterization of the facts and claimed that the prison paralegal did not misadvise Mr. 
Cooke regarding his time limit for filing a notice of appeal. (R., p.74; Affidavit of Janel 
Gardner, pp.l-2.)6 The State did not directly dispute, however, Mr. Cooke's contention 
that the paralegal had refused to notarize and mail his notice of appeal. (See Affidavit 
of Janel Gardner, pp.1-2.)' 
The State offered no evidentiary support for this contention. 
Because these allegations of fact by Roger Bourne, the prosecutor who evidently called Ms. Cooke to 
testify against Mr. Cooke, and who also drafted the State's motion for summary dismissal, are not 
supported by any evidence, such as an affidavit signed by Mr. Bourne, they are not evidence. Meckling 
v. Fontes, 125 Idaho 689,693, 873 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Ms. Gardner's affidavit is attached to a Motion to Augment Record, which is filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
' The paralegal's affidavit admits that she does sometimes "turn inmates away" if they have not scheduled 
an appointment or if their papetwork is not complete, but it does not state whether she, in fact, turned 
Mr. Cooke away and, if so, specifically why she did so. (See Affidavit of Janel Gardner, p.2.) 
On September 28, 2005, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion 
for summary dismissal. (See generally R., pp.83-84; Tr. Vol. 11.)~ With regard to 
Mr. Cooke's two claims relating to Ms. Cooke's memory loss, Mr. Bourne, arguing for 
summary dismissal: (a) urged the district court to remember Ms. Cooke's testimony, and 
to find that Ms. Cooke was, in fact, competent when she gave that testimony (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.3, Ls.8-19); (b) offered his opinion that the jury rendered the verdicts that it did 
because it discounted Ms. Cooke's testimony to a certain degree, thereby indicating, 
perhaps, that Ms. Cooke was adequately impeached (See Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.4); (c) 
argued that, "the petitioner hasn't carried his burden of proving that there was more that 
could have been done to cross-examine Allison Cooke about the state of her memoryn 
(Tr., p.4, Ls.5-8 (emphasis added)). 
With regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for his 
attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal, Mr. Bourne argued that Mr. Cooke's 
trial counsel's affidavit was more persuasive than Mr. Cooke's own sworn statements 
because it was corroborated by the prison paralegal's af f ida~i t .~ (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.15 - 
p.5, L.9.) He also argued that, assuming Mr. Cooke's counsel had rendered deficient 
performance by failing to timely file a notice of appeal, Mr. Cooke could not demonstrate 
any prejudice because he failed to identify what issue might have been appealed and 
he failed prove that he would have been successful on appeal. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.10 - 
There are two separately-bound transcripts in the record in this case. The transcript of an August 16, 
2005, hearing is referenced herein as "Tr. Vol. I," and the transcript of the September 28, 2005, hearing is 
referenced as "Tr. Vol. 11." 
It is notable that in arguing that the two affidavits (both of which appear to have been drafted by 
Mr. Bourne himself) corroborate one another, Mr. Bourne discussed his "recollection" of facts which don't 
appear in either affidavit. (Compare Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.18 - p.5, L.l (arguing that the paralegal had records 
showing that Mr. Cooke made certain requests on certain dates and that these dates were consistent with 
Mr. Cooke's trial attorney's records) with R., pp.76-78 (trial counsel's affidavit, which vaguely asserts that 
p.6, L.2.) Finally, with regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of denial of access to the courts, 
Mr. Bourne argued implicitly that the prison paralegal's affidavit was more persuasive 
than Mr. Cooke's own sworn statements (See Tr. Vol. Ill p.4, L.17 - p.5, L.l) and 
expressed his opinion of what the true facts are: "I think that the defendant went there 
[to the prison paralegal] late then asked her to file certain things or mail certain things to 
the attorney, which she did and it-and it was too late." (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.2-5.) 
After Mr. Bourne concluded his remarks, Mr. Cooke's counsel presented 
arguments in opposition to summary dismissal and fielded numerous questions posed 
by the district court. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.8 - p.15, L.5.) During that 
colloquy, the district court made it clear that, based on its memory of Mr. Cooke's 
underlying criminal case, it disagreed with Mr. Cooke's counsel's characterization of the 
letter attached to Ms. Cooke's affidavit: 
THE COURT: She never testified to that at the trial. She didn't testify as 
to whether or not this was an accident, a true accident. The evidence that 
came out at the trial was is [sic] that, from the investigation, it was 
apparent to those that investigated this case that Mr. Ritchie [sic], after the 
vehicle left the road, accelerated. He did not decelerate. There was no 
braking. It was acceleration demonstrated through that field. So, 
Ms. Cooke did not testify to that.'' 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.9-17.) Ultimately, the district court granted the State's motion for 
summary dismissal. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 16, L.6 - p.18, L.3.) The district court based its grant 
of summary dismissal upon two conclusions. First, it found that Mr. Cooke failed to 
show that Ms. Cooke was incompetent when she testified because "[tlhe court can 
Mr. Cooke did not request an appeal until after the 42-day time limit had run) and Affidavit of Janel 
Gardner (saying nothing about the dates when any interactions with Mr. Cooke had occurred).) 
lo Interestingly, the district court's recollection of the underlying criminal case differs markedly from Mr. 
Bourne's recollection of that case (R., p.73 ("The undersigned's recollection of her testimony is that her 
letter and affidavit are generally consistent with her testimony.").) Moreover, it demonstrates precisely 
why Mr. Cooke should receive a new trial: because Ms. Cooke's testimony, which the State used against 
certainly take notice of the fact that she--during the course of her direct as well as 
cross-examination, she was oriented as to time, date, and place. She was responsive 
to the questions before her. She readily admitted that she had memory lapses during 
that process." (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.11-18.) Second, it concluded that the outcome of 
Mr. Cooke's case would not have been different if he had appealed his conviction. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.7-23.) 
On October 6, 2005, the district court entered an order memorializing and adding 
further detail to its grant of the State's motion for summary disposition." (See generally 
R., pp.85-88.) With regard to Ms. Cooke's trial testimony (which, of course, relates to 
the first and second claims in Mr. Cooke's amended petition), the district court 
summarily rejected Ms. Cooke's sworn statement in which she asserted that her 
memory was not intact, and that she did not know what was going on, when she 
testified at Mr. Cooke's trial. (R., p.86.) It apparently did so based on its memory of 
Ms. Cooke's trial testimony and its belief, based upon that recollection, that Ms. Cooke 
was lucid when she testified: "The Court takes notice that when Ms. Cooke testified, 
she was oriented as to time and place and was able to testify that she remembered 
Mr. Cooke, was markedly different from the facts that Ms. Cooke recalls now that she has more fully 
recovered from her brain injuries. 
l1 As was set forth in some detail in Mr. Cooke's Motion to Remand Case, filed with this Court on August 
I, 2006, it is Mr. Cooke's contention that the district court's October 6, 2005 order looks more like a notice 
of intent to dismiss than an actual order of dismissal because it allowed Mr. Cooke twenty days in which 
to file an second amended petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.88.) However, this Court determined 
that that order is, in fact, a final appealable order. (Order Denying Motion to Remand Case (Sept. 13, 
2006).) 
This Court's Order Denying Motion to Remand Case holds that, "the Order Dismissing Petition 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed with this Court November 7, 2005, is final." (Order Denying Motion 
to Remand Case, p.1.) Undersigned counsel presumes that the November 7, 2005, order in question is 
the same order that the district court issued on October 6, 2005, since the district court has informed 
undersigned counsel that the October 6, 2005, order was the last document filed in Mr. Cooke's case in 
the district court, and this Court has provided undersigned counsel with a copy of the October 6, 2005, 
order which also bears a file stamp from this Court indicating that it was received on November 7, 2005. 
certain things and did not remember others. She was responsive to questions and was 
appropriate in every respect. The jury was informed through her testimony that she had 
some memory lapses." (R., p.86.) The district court also discounted the medical 
evidence related to Ms. Cooke's brain injury because that injury and the subsequent 
medical report preceded Ms. Cooke's trial testimony by five months. (R., p.86.) 
Ultimately, the district court ruled that Mr. Cooke's claims failed because he failed to 
prove that Ms. Cooke was incompetent: "The Court is satisfied that Ms. Cooke was 
competent to testify. The petitioner has not carried his burden to show that trial counsel 
was ineffective in any respect regarding Ms. Cooke." (R., p.86.) 
With regard to Mr. Cooke's trial attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal 
on Mr. Cooke's behalf (which relates to the third claim in Mr. Cooke's amended 
petition), the district court, after reviewing the evidence proffered by both parties, chose 
to believe the State's evidence over that which was offered by Mr. Cooke: "After a 
review of the affidavit of trial counsel and of the. prison paralegal, the Court finds that the 
petitioner did not ask trial counsel to file an appeal until after the appeal time had run." 
(R., p.87.) The district court also ruled, alternatively, that Mr. Cooke could not prevail as 
a matter of law because, even if Mr. Cooke's trial counsel had timely been asked to file 
a notice of appeal, Mr. Cooke failed to even allege prejudice from trial counsel's failure 
to do so because Mr. Cooke did not point out what issue might have been appealed, 
much less did he prove that he could have won on appeal: 
Further, the Court finds that the petitioner has not shown that there was 
any appealable issue. The Court is satisfied that the verdict and the 
sentence are fully supported by the record. The Court knows of no 
appealable issue which would likely have been settled in the petitioner's 
favor. The Court finds that the petitioner has not shown ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the appeal and has not shown prejudice 
to himself from the lack of an appeal. 
(R., p.87.) 
In its October 6, 2005, order summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's amended 
petition, the district court did not even address Mr. Cooke's fourth claim in his amended 
petition-that he had been denied access to the courts when the prison paralegal 
refused to notarize Mr. Cooke's notice of appeal. (See generally R., pp.85-88.) Rather, 
after discussing Mr. Cooke's third claim, the district court concluded by dismissing 
Mr. Cooke's amended petition entirely: "[Tlhe State's Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Petition is granted and the Amended Petition is dismissed. The petitioner has twenty 
days from September 28, 2005, to file an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief." 
(R., pp.87-88.) 
Instead of filing a second amended petition for post-conviction relief, on 
October 27, 2005, Mr. Cooke filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.89-91.) On appeal, 
Mr. Cooke contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his amended 
petition for post-conviction relief, and he requests that the order of dismissal be vacated 
and his case remanded for an evidentiary hearing on each of his four claims. 
I 
ISSUE 
Did the district err in summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's amended petition for post- 










The District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Cooke's Amended Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying 
criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 ldaho 454, 
456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post- 
Conviction Procedure Act (hereinaffer, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -491 1) and the 
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 ldaho at 456, 808 P.2d at 375. 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. I.C. 3 19-4906(c).I2 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, 
the district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 
126 ldaho at 816-817, 892 P.2d at 491-492. However, if the petitioner presents some 
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the 
petitioner's allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the 
State. Tramel v. State, 92 ldaho 643, 646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if 
the allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus, only after the State 
controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the evidence. 
Drapeau v. State, 103 ldaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must 
l2 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(c), which deals with motions for summary 
disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g., Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 
P.2d at 11 55 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under section 19-4906 generally as being 
whether a genuine issue of material fact has been presented). 
still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, 
Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. The district court need not accept those of 
the petitioner's allegations which are "clearly disproved by the record." Coontz v. State, 
129 ldaho 360,368,924 P.2d 622,630 (Ct. App. 1996). 
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 11 55. 
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19- 
4906(b), (c). 
In this case, Mr. Cooke asserts that he has presented sufficient evidence to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the four claims raised in his amended 
petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the district court, therefore, erred in 
summarily dismissing his amended petition, and he requests that the district court's 
order of dismissal be vacated, and that his case be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
A. Mr. Cooke Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact Reqardinq Ms. Cooke's 
Competence To Testifv At Trial And, Thus, Is Entitled To An Evidentiarv Hearinq 
On Both Claims That Relate To That lssue 
The first two claims raised in Mr. Cooke's amended petition (new evidence and 
ineffective assistance of counsel) involve his contention that the alleged victim in his 
underlying criminal case, Ms. Cooke, was incompetent to testify or, at the very least, 
wholly unreliable, based upon her lack of memory of the events to which she testified at 
Mr. Cooke's trial. (R., pp.49-50.) In support of this claim, Mr. Cooke proffered: (1) a 
medical report showing that five months prior to Mr. Cooke's trial, Ms. Cooke sustained 
severe brain injuries resulting in significant memory impairment and causing her to be 
highly susceptible to false memories (R., pp.59-60); and (2) an affidavit from Ms. Cooke, 
with an attached letter, which together discussed her current memory of the night in 
question and asserted that, given the nature of her injuries and the fact that she does 
not even remember the trial, she believes that she was in no shape to have testified 
reliably against Mr. Cooke. (R., pp.54-59.) 
In response, the State attacked the medical report and the affidavit as not being 
contemporaneous with Ms. Cooke's trial testimony and, therefore, "not relevant," and it 
asserted, without any evidentiary support, that, in fact, Ms. Cooke was competent to 
testify at trial." Ultimately, the district court relied on its memory of Ms. Cooke's 
testimony to find that she was, in fact, competent when she testified against Mr. Cooke. 
(R., p.86; Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.9-17, p.16, Ls.11-18.) Thus, it concluded that Mr. Cooke 
"has not carried his burden to show" that Ms. Cooke was incompetent or that her 
testimony was unreliable. (R., p.86; Tr. Vol. 11, p.16, Ls.11-18.) 
Mr. Cooke contends that the district court erred in at least three respects: (1) by 
relying on its memory of Ms. Cooke's testimony; (2) by prematurely resolving the factual 
question of whether Ms. Cooke was competent and gave reliable testimony; and (3) 
apparently holding Mr. Cooke to the wrong standard by requiring him to prove that 
Ms. Cooke was incompetent or unreliable prior to an evidentiary hearing. 
l3 As should be clear from the above statement of facts, rather than putting a transcript or audio tape of 
Ms. Cooke's testimony before the district court, or even asking the district court to take judicial notice of 
such a transcript or tape, the prosecutor, Roger Bourne, spoke of Ms. Cooke's testimony based on his 
memory and urged the district court to rely on its own memory. (R., pp.72-73; Tr. Vol. 11, p.3, L.8 - p.4, 
L.4.) 
1. The District Court Erred Bv Relving On Its Memow Of Ms. Cooke's 
Testimonv During Mr. Cooke's Underlvina Criminal Case 
Although the district court surely could have considered a transcript or audio tape 
of Ms. Cooke's trial testimony, the State never proffered such a transcript or tape and, 
instead, actually requested that the district court to rely on its memory of the trial in 
Mr. Cooke's underlying criminal case. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.3, L.8 - p.4, L.4.) Apparently, the 
district court acceded to this request since it discussed the trial evidence fairly 
extensively with Mr. Cooke's counsel (Tr. Vol. Ill p.9, L.23 - p.11, L.19, p.13),I4 and 
then went on to "take notice of the fact" that Ms. Cooke appeared competent to the 
district court when she testified (R., p.86; Tr. Vol. Ill p.16, Ls.13-18), without citing to 
any transcripts or audio tapes in the underlying case. 
In Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992), the ldaho Supreme 
Court disapproved of just such a practice. In that case the petitioner alleged that he had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 805-807, 839 P.2d at 1219-1221. In 
summarily dismissing those claims, the district court took "judicial notice of the 
proceedings which took place before it and determine[d] that the defendant received 
competent representation at trial. The case was vigorously defended and the issues 
appropriate for consideration were raised." Id. at 807, 839 P.2d at 1221. On appeal, 
the ldaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's summary dismissal of the 
petitioner's ineffective assistance claims, holding as follows: 
The "record" relied upon by the district court consisted only of its "judicial 
notice" of the trial proceedings over which, of course, the trial judge had 
presided. However, there does not appear to be any statutory provision or 
case law precedent which elevates the taking of judicial notices to the 
-- 
14 Notably, it is clear that Mr. Cooke's counsel had not actually read or heard that evidence since he had 
to rely on what had been told to him about the trial from his client. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.9, Ls.23-25.) 
equivalent level of a court record. On the latter, the court may base a sua 
sponte dismissal, but not where a taking of judicial notice, by recollection 
is relied upon. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 limits the scope of facts which may be 
judicially noticed to those "not subject to reasonable dispute in that [they] 
are either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." We are not 
apprised that the facts surrounding the representation of petitioner at the 
trial and on appeal are generally known in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court. Facts may not be judicially noticed simply because they are within 
the personal recollected knowledge of the judge, if those facts are not also 
generally known in the jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the facts attendant to the trial and in turn the appeal are not 
capable of accurate and ready determination . . . . Judicial notice taken of 
prior reported but not transcribed testimony cannot be allowed because 
conclusions drawn from that source are incapable of being reviewed by an 
appellate court. 
[Wle hold that prior to dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, the 
district court is required to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as is 
necessary to a determination "on the basis of the application, the answer 
or motion, and the record," that there are no material issues of fact and 
that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief. In some case, no 
transcript will be necessary because the petition may be deficient on its 
face. In other cases, a partial transcript may be all that is required to 
satisfy the statute. 
Id. at 807-808, 839 P.2d at 1221-1222 (citations and footnotes omitted). This case is no 
different. In this case, just as in Matthews, the district court took notice of what it had 
observed while presiding over the petitioner's underlying criminal trial. Accordingly, a 
similar result should obtain-the district court's order of summary dismissal should be 
vacated and Mr. Cooke's case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
2. The District Court Erred By Resolvinq Factual Issues At The Summary 
Dismissal Stage 
Even if the district court was correct to have taken notice of its own memory of 
the goings-on at Mr. Cooke's trial, its summary dismissal of Mr. Cooke's amended 
petition still turned on: (a) its weighing of its recollection of that testimony against the 
medical report, prepared five months before trial, indicating that Ms. Cooke's memory 
was severely impaired and that she was highly susceptible to false memories, and 
Ms. Cooke's subsequent statements about her memory of the incident in question, and 
her belief that she was greatly impaired when she testified; and (b) its ultimate factual 
determination that Ms. Cooke was competent when she testified. (R., p.86; Tr. Vol. II, 
p.16, Ls.11-21.) 
Mr. Cooke contends that this weighing of competing evidence to arrive at a 
factual conclusion was contrary to the mandate of the UPCPA. As noted above, at the 
summary dismissal stage, even controverted facts must be liberally construed and all 
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the petitioner, and, if a genuine issue 
of fact is raised, the district court must provide the petitioner with an evidentiary hearing. 
Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. Thus, where Mr. Cooke proffered evidence 
which, although not necessarily dispositive as to Ms. Cooke's state of memory at the 
time of trial, certainly tended to indicate that Ms. Cooke's memory might have been 
flawed at the time of her testimony such that she was not competent to give such 
testimony,I5 he at least raised a genuine issue of material fact which required the district 
- -- - 
l5 A witness may be deemed incompetent under I.R.E. 601 if she has no memory of the events in 
question or if her memory is not genuine. See State v. Hall, 111 ldaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 
1 986). 
court to have conducted an evidentiary hearing. See I.C. 5 19-4906(b), (c); Small, 132 
ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. Because the district court failed to provide such an 
evidentiary hearing as required under the UPCPA, this Court should vacate the district 
court's order of summary dismissal and remand Mr. Cooke's case for such a hearing. 
3. The District Court Erred By Holding Mr. Cooke To The Incorrect Leaal 
Standard 
Although closely related to the argument presented in part I(A)(2)-that the 
district court was premature in seeking to weigh the evidence and find the facts 
necessary to fully evaluate Mr. Cooke's amended petition-Mr. Cooke argues 
separately that the district court further erred by apparently applying the wrong legal 
standard in dismissing his amended petition. He contends that the district court 
prematurely required him to prove that Ms. Cooke was incompetent, even though the 
appropriate question at the summary dismissal stage is whether he has presented 
evidence to raise a genuine issue as to whether Ms. Cooke was incompetent. 
In its order granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, the district court 
seemed to say that Mr. Cooke could only survive summary dismissal if his petition, 
together with the record, proved his claims: "The Court is satisfied that Ms. Cooke was 
competent to testify. The petitioner has not carried his burden to show that trial counsel 
was ineffective in any respect regarding Ms. Cooke." (R., p.86.) To the extent that this 
was the standard applied, the district court violated the UPCPA, which provides that 
standard for summary dismissal is whether the petitioner has raised a genuine issue of 
material fact. Compare I.C. 5 19-4906(c) (articulating the standard for summary 
dismissal) with Holmes v. State, 104 ldaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding 
that the burden on the petitioner at an evidentiary hearing is to prove his allegations by 
a preponderance of the evidence). Thus, to the extent that the district court applied the 
wrong standard, this Court should vacate the order of dismissal and remand 
Mr. Cooke's case for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Mr. Cooke Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact Regarding His Trial 
Counsel's Failure To Timely File A Notice Of Appeal And, Thus, Is Entitled To An 
Evidentiarv Hearinq On The Claim Related To That lssue 
The third claim in Mr. Cooke's amended petition was that his trial counsel 
provided him with ineffective assistance for failing to timely file a notice of appeal, even 
though he had specifically requested an appeal on the day he was sentenced. 
(R., pp.50-51.) However, the district court summarily dismissed this claim on two 
grounds: first, the district court believed Mr. Cooke's trial counsel over Mr. Cooke and 
found that Mr. Cooke had not timely requested that an appeal be filed (R., p.87); and 
second, the district court found that because Mr. Cooke had not said what issue might 
have been successfully appealed, Mr. Cooke would not have suffered any prejudice 
even if his trial counsel had rendered a deficient performance by failing to file a notice of 
appeal which had been timely requested. (R., p.87; Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.7-23.) 
Mr. Cooke contends that both of the district court's conclusions were in error. 
With regard to the district court's factual finding that, contrary to Mr. Cooke's verified 
amended petition and sworn affidavit (R., p.50, 64-65), he had not, timely requested that 
his attorney initiate an appeal, the district court's fact-finding was premature. As 
explained fully in Parts I(A)(2) and (3), above, the relevant inquiry at the summary 
dismissal stage is whether the petitioner has presented evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. If so, of course, the district court should not seek to 
resolve that question of fact until after it has provided the petitioner with the statutorily 
required evidentiary hearing. I.C. §§ 19-4906, -4907. In this case, Mr. Cooke's verified 
petition and affidavit did raise such a question of fact. Because Mr. Cooke said one 
thing and his trial counsel said another, there was a disputed question of fact which 
necessitated an evidentiary hearing. 
With regard to the district court's conclusion that Mr. Cooke's trial counsel could 
not have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to timely file a notice of appeal 
unless Mr. Cooke could prove that he would have prevailed on appeal, the district court 
simply misapprehended the law. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the 
United States Supreme Court held that deficient performance results if "this particular 
defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing," 
and that under such circumstances prejudice is presumed "with no further showing from 
the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 
483-484. 
Because the district court's factual finding was premature and because the 
district court's legal conclusion was incorrect as a matter of law, the district court erred 
in summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's claim that his trial counsel failed to timely file a 
notice of appeal as requested. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court's 
summary dismissal order and remand Mr. Cooke's case for an evidentiary hearing. 
C. Mr. Cooke Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact Regarding The Prison 
Paraleqal's Refusal To Timely Notarize And Mail Mr. Cooke's Notice Of Appeal 
And, Thus, Is Entitled To An Evidentiarv Hearing On The Claim Related To That 
lssue 
The fourth claim in Mr. Cooke's amended petition was that he was denied access 
to the courts when the prison paralegal misadvised him of the date on which his notice 
of appeal was due, and then proceeded to refuse to notarize or mail Mr. Cooke's pro se 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.50-51; 62-63.) Although the State refuted the factual 
allegations presented in Mr. Cooke's verified amended petition and his sworn affidavit 
(R., p.74; Affidavit of Janel Gardner, pp.1-2; Tr. Vol. Ill p.4, L.17 - p.5, ~ . 5 ) , ' ~  the district 
court never recognized the factual dispute and, in fact, never even ruled specifically on 
this particular claim. (See generally R., pp.85-88 (district court's summary dismissal 
order); Tr. Vol. II. (transcript of hearing on State's motion for summary dismissal).) 
Because the district court never specifically addressed Mr. Cooke's fourth claim 
for relief, but nevertheless denied Mr. Cooke's amended petition in its entirety, the 
district court must be presumed to have dismissed that claim on the grounds set forth in 
the State's responsive pleading." However, since the arguments proffered by the State 
amount to nothing more than an attempt to rebut some of the evidence offered through 
Mr. Cooke's verified amended petition and sworn affidavit, they demonstrate the 
existence of a material question of fact which, as discussed at length above, may only 
be resolved through an evidentiary hearing. 
Because the district court's order of summary dismissal of this particular claim 
apparently turned on the district court's premature weighing of evidence and resolving a 
factual dispute, it was in error. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court's 
summary dismissal order and remand Mr. Cooke's case for an evidentiary hearing. 
l6 AS discussed above in note 7, the State did not offer any evidence to refute Mr. Cooke's allegation that 
the prison paralegal refused to notarize and mail his notice of appeal. The only argument that the State 
offered as to this point was Mr. Bourne's personal opinion about the true facts: "I think that the defendant 
went there late and then asked her to file certain things or mail certain things to the attorney, which she 
did, and it-and it was too late." (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.2-5.) 
l7 Otherwise, the dismissal would be deemed to be a sua sponte dismissal under I.C. 5 19-4906(b) for 
which the district court failed to give adequate prior notice. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 
P.2d 488,493 (Ct. App. 1995). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court's order summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's amended petition for post- 
conviction relief, and that it remand his case for an evidentiary hearing as to all four of 
his claims. 
DATED this 1 lth day of October, 2006. 
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